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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HENRY HUMMEL, and MABEL D.
HUMMEL, his wife, ..
Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
7849

WILLIAM YOUNG, and MAUD M.
YOUNG, his wife, et al.,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial of this case resulted in the establishment of
these facts among others : That the respondents and the
appellants obtained their respective properties from the
same predecessor, namely, A. H. LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre,
who obtained the entire property in question in this law
suit from Olof L. Hedenberg and Annie E. Hedenberg,
his wife, by a warranty deed dated September 19, 1922,
with the following description:
"Commencing 21 chains West and 14.50 chains
South of the Northeast Corner of Southeast 1~ of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Sec. 7, Township 7 South, Range 2 East of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; Running thence South 1
degree West 4.87 chains; thence South 89 degrees
East 7.71 chains more or less to the Street line;
thence North 29 degrees West 5.62 chains more or
less along the Street line to the intersection of the
Street running East and West; thence North 89
degrees West along said Street line 4.90 chains, more
or less to the place of be~inning, the same being a
part of the Southeast %, of Section 7, containing
an area of 3.07 acres."
On the sixth day of May, 1924, in a deed dated of that
date and recorded on the same date, A. H. LeVitre and
Lydia LeVitre, his wife, conveyed the property which is
now the appellants' property to Henry Clavel and S. Perkowski who conveyed the property to the appellants herein
in 1925. On the eighth day of May, 1924, the property which
is now the respondents' property was conveyed by A. H.
LeVitre to Lydia LeVitre, however, both A. H. LeVitre and
Lydia LeVitre executed various mortgages and other security instruments from that time against the property of
respondents until 1936. Then the respondents' property
through successive transfers came to the respondents sometime in 1945 and the dispute between these parties arising
sometime in 1951, as a result of a purported survey by the
respondents.
At the time the appellants purchased their property in
1925, there was a street on the east (which is still there)
known as the State Highway and a street on the north of
their property known as Ninth South Street in Provo, Utah,
(which street is still there). At the time of purchase of
the property by the appellants in 1925, there was a fence
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separating the property on the north from the street, which
fence is still there, and on the south of appellants' property
there was no fence at all. The evidence further shows
that sometime in 1925 after the appellants purchased the
property that Mr. LeVitre and Mr. William Young, one
of the appellants herein, went out upon the ground and Mr.
LeVitre made marks on the fence at the east and on the
west of appellants' property as being the mark setting off
the south boundary of the appellants' property;
The evidence further shows that Mr. and Mrs. LeVitre
owned the property which is now the respondents' property and occupied the same until 1936. This fact is shown
both by the testimony of appellant, William Young, and by
the fact that the respondents' property was mortgaged
several times and satisfaction of the same was shown as
being executed in Provo, Utah, until 1936 (see Abstract of
Title) . The evidence also shows without dispute that the
appellants, William Young and Andrew Young, built the
fence in question on the line pointed out by Mr. LeVitre in
1928, in the month of April or May. That a certain person
by the name of Chris Peterson who had purchased property to the south of the LeVitre property purchased the
wire and posts but had no part in building the fence or
locating it where it was built in 1928, and where it is today.
That the appellants, William Young and Andrew Young,
built the fence as a boundary fence and that the LeVitres
occupied and possessed the property until 1936, at which
time it was conveyed to one of respondents' predecessors
in title. The evidence also shows by the testimony of William Young that measurements were taken of appellants'
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property from the old fence on the north of his property to
the old fence on the south of his property at both ends and
that the distance measured was 126 feet.
The evidence in this case is undisputed that there was
no survey of the property in question made by either of
the parties' or known by either of the parties ftom the time
appellants purchased their property in 1925, until the respondents allegedly had a survey made in 1950. There is
no other evidence concerning the location of appellants'
south boundary except as previously stated. It is also a
fact worthy to be mentioned, that the respondents purchased their property in 1945, after having made a physical
inspection of the property, together with an observation
as to the location of the existing fences and that their purchase was made thereafter. That respondents assumed
and used the existing fences as boundaries until1951, when
they made demand upon appellants to move their fence.

APPELLANTS' POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE COMMON PREDECESSOR IN
TITLE OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS INTENDED TO CONVEY PROPERTY TO APPELLANTS LYING SOUTH AND
WEST OF 9TH SOUTH STREET AND STATE
HIGHWAY IN PROVO, UTAH, BY HIS CONVEYANCE IN .1924, AND THAT RESPONDSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ENTS ARE BOUND BY THAT PRIOR CONV~YANCE.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE FENCE ERECTED BY APPELLANTS IN 1928 HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS
A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN APPELLANTS
AND RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS IN
TITLE FROM THAT TIME UNTIL 1951 WHEN
THIS SUIT WAS BROUGHT AND THAT SAID
FENCE HAS BECOME A BOUNDARY FENCE
WHICH CANNOT BE MOVED BY RESPONDENTS.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY OF RESPONDENTS' LAND.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE COMMON PREDECESSOR IN
TITLE OF BOTH APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS INTENDED TO CONVEY PROPERTY TO APPELLANTS LYING SOUTH AND
WEST OF 9TH SOUTH STREET AND STATE
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HIGHWAY IN PROVO, UTAH, BY HIS CONVEYANCE IN 1924, AND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE BOUND BY THAT PRIOR CONVEYANCE.

It is to be noted from the evidence that in 1922, when
the predecessor of the parties hereto, A. H. LeVitre and
Lydia LeVitre, received their property, it was described
as set out in the facts showing metes and bounds in part
as follows:
"Thence South 89 degrees East 7.71 chains,
more or less, to the Street line; thence North 29
degrees West 5.62 chains, more or less, along the
street line to the intersection of the street running
East and West; thence North 89 degrees West along
said street line 4.90 chains, more or less, to the place
of beginning."
This deed shows a recognition of the existing streets and
described the property in relation thereto. The importance
of this being that the predecessors in title of respondents
and appellants received only the property inside the natural
boundaries established by State Street on the east and Ninth
South Street on the North. The property conveyed in 1924,
to appellants' predecessor in title failed to show the limitation of the existing streets. Likewise, the conveyance at
a later time of the property of respondents to their predecessor, Lydia Le Vitre, likewise failed to show the limitation of the existing streets. However, it would appear to be
a matter of fundamental law that the deeds in question
must be construed to include only a sale of property owned
by the grantors and that certainly it was not the intention
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of the grantors of appellants to convey property out in the
existing streets and then through another line of deeds,
encroach upon the· property necessary to make the full
measure of property conveyed to appellants. The grantors
by their actions and acquiescence have shown what the
intention of their conveyance was.
Another way of saying this is that certainly Lydia
LeVitre cannot through her successors in title derogate
from her grant to the appellants herein. The testimony
shows that the width of the property north and south between the old fence on the north and the old fence on the
south of appellants' property is 126 feet which is almost
the exact measurement of appellants' property given by
their deed. Thus we see that the appellants are occupying
only the amount of ground given to them by their deed
bounded on two sides by existing streets and that to permit
the respondents to move the fence on the south would result in the reduction of property given to appellants by
respondents' predecessor in title.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE FENCE ERECTED BY APPELLANTS IN 1928 HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS
A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN APPELLANTS
AND RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS IN
TITLE FROM THAT TIME UNTIL 1951 WHEN
THIS SUIT WAS BROUGHT AND THAT SAID
FENCE HAS BECOME A BOUNDARY FENCE
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WHICH CANNOT BE MOVED BY RESPONDENTS.
Perhaps the most important question which arises in
this case is the one concerning whether or not the building
of a fence by appellants herein in the year 1928 upon the
line pointed out by A. H. LeVitre and the maintenance of
that fence until the present time brings this case within
the rules established by the decisions of our courts concerning the establishment of boundaries by practical location,
or acquiescence. The appellants do not admit and I do not
believe the evidence compels us to concede that the appellants occupied any of the respondents' deeded ground, but
we shall turn our attention to the question just propounded.
Beginning with the case of Larsen vs. Onesite, 21 U.
38, 59 P. 234, where it is said:
"where adjoining land owners and their predecessors in title have occupied their lands to a given
line, and have treated such line as a boundary between their land for twenty years, neither owner can
claim beyond such line."
U.
To the case of Ekburg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205,
our courts .have recognized the doctrine of boundary by
practical location and by acquiescence. In this case the undisputed evidence shows that some time after the purchase
of the property in question by appellants that A. H. LeVitre,
the common predecessor in title of the parties hereto, actually pointed out the marks on the east and west fence,
respectively, of the appellants' property which would mark
the south boundary of said property. That the appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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built the fence along said line in the spring of 1928 and
that the appellants and respondents and their predecessors
cultivated and used the land to the respective sides of the
fence without ever at any time disputing the fact that it
was indeed the boundary. The evidence shows that the
appellants built chicken coops along said fence, planted
trees and shrubbery along said fence, and planted fruit
trees and cultivated the disputed strip of ground. The evidence also shows that the respondents' predecessors, the
LeVitres, built sheds on the south side of said fence, including a garage. That the successive owners of the respondents' property purchased said property and occupied the
same without making any survey and without ever raising
any question as to the boundary between the two properties until the respondents herein brought their action. Acquiescence in the maintenance of a fence or boundary is
essentially negative in form and thus where the parties
have occupied and improved their respective properties on
each side of the fence without protest for a period of over
seven years, then the doctrine of acquiescence is to be applied.
In the case of Brown vs. Millner,
2d 202, it is said as follows :

u.

., 232 P.

"We have further held in this state that in absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their predecessors in interest ever expressly
agreed as to the location of the boundary between
them, if they have occupied their respective premises
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for . a long period of
time and mutually recognized it as the dividing line
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing, and will not permit
the parties nor their grantees to depart from such
line.
"In some of the opinions of this court on the
subject of disputed boundaries, there are statements
~ to the effect that the location of the true boundary
must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute before an
agreement between the adjoining land owners fixing the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp vs.
Bagley, in support therof. Such statements should
be understood to mean that if the location of the
true boundary line is known to the adjoining owners,
they cannot by parol agreement establish the boundary elsewhere. As was pointed out in the Tripp case,
such an agreement would be in contravention of the
statute of frauds. But the Tripp case does not require a party relying upon a boundary which has
been acquiesced in for a long period of time to produce evidence that the location of the true boundary
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the
true boundary was uncertain or in dispute and that
the parties agreed upon the recognized boundary as
the dividing line will be implied from the parties'
long acquiescence.
"The line must be open, visible, marked by monuments, fences or buildings and recognized as the
boundary for a long term of years. It was expressly
stated by the court in the case of Holmes vs. Judge,
that there was no evidence how the fence and building which were recognized as the boundary came
to be erected, or that there was ever any dispute
between the adjoining owners concerning the location of the true boundary, or that any question was
ever raised as to its location until shortly before the
plaintiff commenced his action."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

In this case we have the evidence before the court as
to how the fence was built and we have the undisputed
testimony that it was built pursuant to an agrement between A. H. LeVitre and William Young, who was the
common grantor in the chain of title of both the parties
hereto. This evidence certainly is sufficient within itself
to show a practical location of the boundary between the
two properties in question. However, we have the additional
facts that the fence was built on a line pointed out by Mr.
LeVitre and that the respective owners and successive
owners of the respondents' property beginning with A. H.
LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre down to the present respondents occupied the property to the south without question as
to proper location of said fence and, in fact, the present
respondents purchased the property with the full understanding that the fence on the north marked the north
boundary of their property.
As pointed out in the above Millner case and in the
portion particularly italicized, we see that the courts announced the doctrine that it is not necessary for the party
relying upon the doctrine of acquiescence to show that there
was ever any dispute or doubt as to the location of the
true boundary. In this case we have the fact that when
the property was purchased by appellants there was no
fence in existence on the south to mark the division between their property and the property retained by the
LeVitres. Certainly, from an actual, practical consideration there was uncertainty as to the location of the boundary in this case. The additional facts of the building of
the fence along the line pointed out by Mr. LeVitre and
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the long acquiescence by the parties hereto and their predecessors to that line and the recognition of it as the boundary certainly reinforces the evidence produced by the appellant, William Young, that there was, indeed, an agreement establishing the fence in question as the boundary
line.

It is also to be noted in summary that the property
occupied by appellant is the same amount as called for by
his deed and that the original deed of the grantors, A. H.
LeVitre and Lydia LeVitre, clearly places the property inside the existing streets which bound the property on two
sides. Under these facts it would seem proper to apply the
doctrine of practical location to establish the boundary on
the line where it is today.
As concerns the establishment of a boundary by practical location, the general law is as set out in 11 Corpus
Juris Secundum, Page 650 as follows :
"Practical location is but an actual designation
by the parties on the ground of the monuments and
bounds called for by their deeds. To constitute a
practical location of a line, the mutual act and acquiescence between the parties is required. It is in fact
merely the result of an agreement or acquiescence
between the parties shown by the location of monuments and marks on the ground.
"A practical location made by the common
grantor of the division line between the tracts
granted is· binding on the· grantees who take with
reference to that boundary. The line established in
that manner is presumably the line mentioned in
the deed, and no lapse of time is necessary to establish such location, which does not rest on acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quiescence in an erroneous boundary, but on the fact
that the true location was made, and. the conveyance
in reference to it."
In the most recent pronouncement by our Supreme
Court found in Oscar F. Ekberg et ux. vs. Von D. Bates,
et ux., 239 P. 2d 205, . . U ..' .. , (1951) said:
"In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed
that the original picket fence was built by a man
who owned both appellants' and respondents' tracts
of land at that time and therefore it is apparent it
was not erected to mark a boundary line. For the
portion of that time during which both tracts were
owned by the same person, there could be no boundary by acquiescence. However, the court made another finding in which it found that when the board
fence was erected in 1927, the true boundary line
was still uncertain and in dispute and that this fence
was erected as a boundary fence and acquiesced in
as such by the parties hereto and their grantors up
until the time this suit was brought."
"The length of time necessary to establish a
boundary line by acquiescence has never been definitely established in this jurisdiction. Each case
must usually be determined on its own facts: In
other jurisdictions there have been statements made
which indicate that the length of time should be at
least that prescribed by the statute of limitations.
In the case of Kesler vs. Ellis, 4 7 Idaho 740, 278 P.
366, the court said: "* * * while the authorities
are helplessly confused and generally uncertain as to
the time the acquiescence as to the location of the
boundary line should continue in order to satisfy the
rule, it is but logical to say that such acquiescence
must continue for a period of not less than five
years, thus conforming to the period established by
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the statute of limitations in cases of adverse possession * * * "
"In the instant case as we have pointed out
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence for
more than 7 years (the Utah limitations period for
adverse possession) before appellants acquired their
title and under all the circumstances shown herein
that was a sufficient length of time to establish the
line so that appellants are precluded from claiming
that it is not the true line."
"It is true that since Ekberg, Jr. has been the
owner of the property he has verbally protested that
the fence was not the true boundary line and therefore he probably did not actually acquiesce in it, still
he did not take any action to assert ownership until
this suit was commenced about 14 years after he.
acquired the title. Under all these circumstances we
are of the opinion the court did not err when it
found that the board fence was the boundary line by
acquiescence."
It would appear that under both doctrines that the
appellants have established their right to occupy and use
the property up to the existing fence on the south and
that said fence should be considered as the boundary between the properties of respondents and appellants.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY .OF RESPONDENTS' LAND.
As previously indicated appellants do not concede that
they occupy any of the respondents' ground. The surveyor,
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Frank Jones, testified (Beginning on page 29, line 17 to
page 33, line 30) that in the sections of land there is usually
an overage or a shortage of ground in respect to a surveyor's section of 80 chains on each side; That Section 7
has such an overage; That this fact often causes uncertainty in actually laying a description out on the ground;
That he assumed that the overage was not considered in
the Hummel and Young deeds because when he checked the
Peterson deed (Tract 3 in Exhibit J) without using the
overage it coincided with the existing fence lines on the
Peterson tract; That there is a conflict between the Humtnel
and Peterson deeds.
The point to be made by this line of argument is that
the evidence of the respondents' surveyor fails to satisfactorily show that his platting and staking of Hummel and
Young deeds was correct in that he reasoned that because
tract 3 was apparently surveyed without considering the
overage in the section so were tracts 1 and 2. Yet at the
same time he shows a conflict between the descriptions of
tracts 1 and 2 with tract 3. Tracts 1 and 2 extend out into
the street on the east, and tract 1 extends out into the
street on the north when laid out using the surveyor's assumption. The original LeVitre deed used the streets on
two sides to show that the surveyor had used distances with
a compensation for the overage in the section.

It is notable that by using the two streets as two sides
the appellants occupy only the amount of property specified
in their deed.
Certainly Mr. Jones said nothing more than that by
assuming that the Hummel and Young descriptions were
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made without taking into consideration the overage in Section 7 they do not coincide with the existing fences. Certainly it cannot be said that this is conclusive proof that
the Young property (tract 1) encroaches on the Hummel
property when we have such sure facts in the two streets
which bound the Young property on two sides. These two
streets appear in the LeVitre·deed received from Hedenberg
in 1922, which were left out of the deeds of appellants' and
respondents' predecessors' deeds possibly by inadvertance
but most certainly not for the purpose of conveying part
of those streets, by those deeds.

CONCLUSION
It would seem that this is one of those cases which
helps to high-light the virtue of the principle of repose
announced by our Court.

In the face of uncertainty in the Survey (the surveyor
said he did not know how the original descriptions were
made but assumed certain unprovable facts) and of long
years of acquiescence in the existing fences by all parties
concerned it could hardly be in the interest of justice to
permit the shifting of these- boundary lines. If the doctrine
of repose is to have any practical value, then it must be
applied to such a case as this. The passage of time obliterates the evidence of men's agreements and all we can find
is the salient facts that in this case a fence was built and
respected by everyone for some 24 years as the boundary
between two pieces of property. Even the respondents purchased their property after .visual inspection ( witho?t a
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survey) and after being satisfied with its size and shape
and upon the assumption that only that land inside the
fences was being purchased. So the respondents purchased
their land and lived there almost six years when by chance
it was suggested that evidence might be found which would
show that the existing fences were not in harmony with
the technical description in their deed.

It is submitted that respondents are not entitled to
the judgment given them in the lower Court, and it should
be reversed with directions that their action be dismissed.
Respectfully Submitted,
PETER M. LOWE,
Attorney for Appellants.
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